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Revealed preference with limited consideration
By Thomas Demuynck and Christian Seel
We derive revealed preference tests for models where individu-
als use consideration sets to simplify their consumption problem.
Our basic test provides necessary and sucient conditions for con-
sistency of observed choices with the existence of consideration set
restrictions. The same conditions can also be derived from a model
in which the consideration set formation is endogenous and based
on subjective, unconstrained beliefs about the prices. By impos-
ing restrictions on these subjective beliefs, we obtain additional
rened revealed preference tests. We illustrate and compare the
performance of our tests by means of a dataset on household con-
sumption choices.
JEL: D11, D12, D81
Keywords: Revealed preference, bounded rationality, consideration
set
Motivation
Choosing is dicult, especially if the set of available alternatives is large or
if the alternatives are dicult to compare. A possible approach to simplify the
decision problem is to rst narrow down the set of all options into a smaller `con-
sideration set' and then make an optimal choice from this reduced set. Many
studies in the marketing and psychology literatures provide strong evidence for
such a `consider then choose' decision process.1 In this paper, we develop revealed
preference tests for dierent models of bounded rationality in which the choice
process is determined by considerations sets. We use data from a large homes-
can consumer dataset on household grocery purchases in order to evaluate the
empirical performance of the dierent models.
Revealed preference analysis started with the seminal contributions of Samuel-
son (1938) and Houthakker (1950) and was further extended by Afriat (1967),
Diewert (1973), and Varian (1982). A key axiom in revealed preference theory
is the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference, abbreviated as GARP. GARP
provides necessary and sucient conditions for a nite dataset on prices and
quantities to be consistent with the neo-classical model of utility maximizing be-
havior. In this canonical model, individuals consider all bundles in their budget
set and choose a bundle that is best according to their utility function.
 Demuynck: Maastricht University, School of Business and Economics, Tongersestraat 53, 6211
LM Maastricht, The Netherlands, t.demuynck@maastrichtuniversity.nl. Seel: Maastricht Univer-
sity, School of Business and Economics, Tongersestraat 53, 6211 LM Maastricht, The Netherlands,
c.seel@maastrichtuniversity.nl.
1See Roberts and Lattin (1997) for an overview.
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In many microeconomic consumption datasets, it is found that consumers limit
their purchases to a small subset of the set of all available goods. This behavior
satises GARP if the decision maker buys none of the other goods because it
is utility maximizing for her to do so. An alternative explanation, however, is
that the purchased quantities of some goods are zero simply because these goods
were not considered by the decision maker. In this case, the observed choice
behavior may not satisfy GARP, although the choices are still optimal given her
consideration sets.
Figure 1 illustrates the idea in a two goods setting. There are two choice
situations corresponding to the two solid budget lines. In the rst situation,
with the steeper budget line, the decision maker chooses bundle a which contains
nothing of good 2. In the second choice situation, the decision maker chooses b
which contains positive amounts of both goods. In the rst situation, a and b are
both aordable but a was chosen. It follows that a is revealed preferred to b. In
the second choice situation, again both a and b are available but now b is chosen,
so b is also revealed preferred to a. Since a is in the interior of this budget set,
the choice behavior violates GARP.2
Now, consider a setting with consideration sets where in the rst choice situation
the decision maker did not consider good 2. In this case, the best she can do is to
spend her entire disposable income on good 1. Since option b was not `feasible'
in the rst choice situation, we cannot conclude that bundle a is preferred to
bundle b. Thus, the decision maker could still be utility maximizing given her
consideration sets.
Unfortunately, for real life datasets, consideration sets are not observable.
Then, the relevant question is whether it is possible to construct consideration
sets such that the observed behavior is rational for these constructed considera-
tion sets. We solve this problem by providing a new revealed preference axiom,
the Limited Axiom of Revealed Preference (LARP). Essentially, LARP boils down
to verifying GARP on a partition of the original dataset, where the partition is
determined by the goods having strictly positive consumption.
LARP provides a set of necessary and sucient conditions for consistency of
choice behavior when taking into account the presence of consideration sets. The
axiom remains agnostic about the way the consideration sets are formed. There-
fore, we also present an equivalent model, where the construction of the consid-
eration sets is made more explicit. This model considers a utility maximizing
decision maker who bases her consumption choice not on the actual prices but
on some subjective belief about the prices. Initially, the decision maker forms
her consideration set by gathering all goods that she would like to buy, i.e., the
goods she would like to consume with strictly positive amounts given her subjec-
tive prices. In a next step, the decision maker learns the true prices of the goods
in this consideration set. In this way, the subjective prices for the goods in the
consideration set are updated to the true prices. Given these updated subjective
2See the next section for a formal denition of GARP.
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Figure 1. An example with two goods
.
good 2
good 1
a
b
prices the decision maker may nd it optimal to update her consideration set, i.e.,
she may introduce new goods that she would like to buy. In this case, she learns
the true prices for these new goods which were added to her consideration set
and she may again choose to update her consideration set by including additional
goods that she would like to buy. This process continues until the decision maker
no longer desires to update her consideration set. In the end, for all goods in
the consideration set, the subjective prices correspond to the actual prices but
for goods outside the consideration set, subjective prices may deviate from true
prices. In other words, the decision maker is not informed about the prices of the
goods that she does not consider.
For the example in Figure 1, in choice situation 1, the subjective price of good
1 must equal the true price|if good 1 is bought, it must be in the consideration
set. The subjective price of good 2, however, might dier from its true price. This
subjective price generates a `subjective' budget line, represented by the dashed
line, which may dier from the true budget line. Using this new budget line, we
observe that the two observations are consistent with GARP.
For real{life datasets, we do not observe subjective prices. Thus, the question
is whether there exists a set of subjective prices that can explain the observed
choice behavior. In the main text, we show that we can construct such prices if
and only if the dataset satises LARP. In other words, the model with subjective
prices and the model with consideration sets are empirically indistinguishable.
Subsequently, we present three models which restrict the admissible values of
the subjective prices. In the rst model, we consider the case where the subjective
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prices cannot deviate too much from the true prices. In this case, beliefs are almost
correct, but small deviations are possible. In the second model, subjective prices
are based on the average prices over all observations. This means that beliefs are
correct on average but short term deviations from the true prices are possible.
In a third model, beliefs are adaptive in the sense that they are determined by
the previously observed prices. For each of these three scenarios, we derive the
corresponding revealed preference restrictions.
Literature overview
Our paper is related to a growing literature in economics that takes into ac-
count choice behavior with consideration sets; see, among others, Eliaz and
Spiegler (2011), Manzini and Mariotti (2012), Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay
(2012), Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2013), Tyson (2013), and Manzini and Mari-
otti (2014). Most of these papers depart from a choice theoretic framework where
choice sets are assumed to be discrete, i.e., individuals choose from a nite set
of alternatives. In this note, we extend this literature of bounded rational choice
behavior to models with continuous choice and we look at its testable implica-
tions from a revealed preference perspective a la Afriat. Most of the papers in
the literature obtain information on the underlying consideration sets by carefully
varying the choice sets and observing where decision makers have revealed pref-
erence reversals. For example, Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2012) depart
from the assumption that consideration sets do not change if non-considered al-
ternatives are removed from the choice set. Then, if some alternative x is chosen
from a choice set T that includes an alternative y but x is not chosen from the
choice set T nfyg, then y must have been part of the consideration set for T (and
therefore, x is preferred to y). If not, the two choice sets T and T n fyg would
have the same consideration set, which contradicts the choice reversal.
In our setting, however, choice sets are exogenously determined by the observed
prices and total expenditure in the dataset. Since we cannot freely manipulate
the choice sets, we need to retrieve information on consideration sets in a dierent
way. In our framework, this information is not obtained by revealed preference
reversals but by the absence of positive consumption.
Outline
Section I contains a short introduction to revealed preference theory. Readers
familiar with this topic can safely skip this section. Section II contains the re-
vealed preference characterization for the limited consideration model. In Section
III, we describe the revealed preference model where the decision maker bases her
consumption decision on her subjective beliefs. Section IV contains the empirical
illustration. Finally, Section V concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
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I. Revealed Preference
The basic ingredient of revealed preference theory is a nite dataset on prices
and quantities. Datasets are denoted by S = fpt;qtgt2T , where T is a nite set
of observations, pt =

p1t ; : : : ; p
n
t

is a row vector of strictly positive prices, and
qt =

q1t ; : : : ; q
n
t
0
is a column vector of non-negative consumption quantities for
the n dierent goods. A dataset reects the observed purchase behavior qt for a
decision maker who faces prices pt at observation t.
DEFINITION 1: A dataset S = fpt;qtgt2T is rationalizable if there exists a
(locally non-satiated) utility function u : Rn ! R and for all observations t 2 T ,
there exists an expenditure level mt  0 such that
qt 2 argmax
q
u(q) s.t. ptq  mt:
In words, a dataset is rationalizable if the chosen bundles, qt, are consistent
with the model of utility maximization subject to a linear budget constraint.
The bundle qt is directly revealed preferred to the bundle qv if ptqt  ptqv,
i.e., the bundle qt was at least as costly as the bundle qv at observation t. We
write this as qtRqv. The indirect revealed preference relation RT is the transitive
closure of the relation R, i.e., qtRTqv if there exists a (possibly empty) sequence
r; s; : : : ; w of observations in T such that qtRqr;qrRqs; : : : ;qwRqv. The dataset
S = fpt;qtgt2T satises the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP)
if for all qtRTqv it is not the case that pvqv > pvqt; if qt is indirectly revealed
preferred to qv it is not the case that qv was purchased although qt was less
expensive.
In a seminal contribution to the literature Afriat (1967) showed that GARP is
a necessary and sucient condition for rationalizability.
THEOREM 1 (Afriat's theorem): Consider a dataset S = fpt;qtgt2T . Then the
following are equivalent:
(i) S is rationalizable by a locally non-satiated utility function.
(ii) S satises GARP.
(iii) For all observations t 2 T , there exist numbers t and t > 0 such that for
all observations t; v 2 T ,
t   v  vpv(qt   qv):
(iv) S is rationalizable by a strictly monotone and concave utility function.
The linear inequalities in the third condition are called the Afriat inequalities.
In order to grasp the intuition behind these inequalities, let us assume that the
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dataset is rationalizable by a utility function which is concave, strictly monotone
and dierentiable. Then, by concavity, we obtain that for all observations t; v 2 T ,
u(qt)  u(qv) 
nX
i=1
@u(qv)
@qi
(qit   qiv):
From the rst order conditions of the utility maximization problem, we also have
that
@u(qv)
@qi
= vp
i
v if q
i
v > 0;
@u(qv)
@qi
 vpiv if qiv = 0:
where t is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint. Substituting this
rst order condition into the concavity restriction and setting t = u(qt), and
v = u(qv), gives
t   v  vpv(qt   qv):
Thus, the Afriat inequalities provide us with an estimate of the utility levels
t = u(qt) and marginal utility of income levels t at the dierent observations.
II. Limited Consideration
In this section, we present a model of decision making based on consideration
sets. In order to keep the analysis as general as possible, we abstain from placing
any restriction on how consideration sets are formed.
Consider a decision maker with a striclty monotone utility function u : Rn+ !
R.3 At each observation t, the decision maker decides on her consumption bundle
qt over the set of goods G = f1; : : : ; ng. However, if she goes to the shop to
purchase her bundle, she does not always take all goods into consideration.
More precisely, at each observations t, she only considers a subset It  G of
goods. The set It is called her consideration set at observation t. It contains
all goods that the decision maker considers for positive consumption, i.e., the
consumption of each good outside this consideration set is equal to zero. For the
goods in her consideration set, however, the decision maker chooses the quantities
that maximize her utility. Formally, at each observation t, the decision maker
3The strenghtening from locally non-satiation to strict monotonicity is necessary because in the
limited consideration framework, locally non-satiation is not sucient to guarantee that the budget set
is binding.
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faces the constrained optimization problem
max
q
u(q) s.t. ptq  mt;
qi = 0 8 i =2 It;
where mt is the total disposable income at observation t. Observe that there
might be some goods j 2 It for which qj = 0. In words, it is possible that the
decision maker considers some good j, but nds it optimal not to buy it.
DEFINITION 2: A dataset S = fpt;qtgt2T is rationalizable with limited con-
sideration if there exists a strictly monotone utility function u : Rn+ ! R and for
all t 2 T , there exist incomes mt and consideration sets It  G such that
qt 2 argmax
q
u(q) s.t. ptq  mt;
qi = 0 8 i =2 It:
Denition 2 diers from Denition 1, since we introduce additional constraints
based on the consideration sets It. Note, however, that Denition 2 is weaker,
since it boils down to Denition 1 for the special case where It = G.
For a dataset S = fpt;qtgt2T and an observation t 2 T , let us denote by Jt the
subset of goods for which the corresponding elements of qt are non-zero, i.e., the
set of goods that have strictly positive components in qt:
Jt = fi 2 Gjqit > 0g:
If the dataset is rationalizable with limited consideration, then we know that
Jt  It: if some good is consumed, then it must be in the consideration set.
The following lemma shows that there is no loss in generality by assuming that
It = Jt.
LEMMA 1: A dataset S = fpt;qtgt2T is rationalizable with limited considera-
tion if and only if it is rationalizable with limited consideration using the consid-
eration sets It = Jt.
Let us partition the set of observations T according to the equivalence classes
generated by the sets Jt. Two observations t and v are in the same element of the
partition if and only if Jt = Jv. Let us denote this partition by ES . The set ES
partitions the set of observations T and therefore the dataset S = fpt;qtgt2T into
sub-datasets SE = fpt;qtgt2E , where E 2 ES . We say that the dataset S satises
the Limited Axiom of Revealed Preference (LARP) if each of these sub-datasets
satises GARP. We obtain the following characterization.
THEOREM 2: Consider a dataset S = fpt;qtgt2T . The following statements
are equivalent:
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(i) S is rationalizable with limited consideration by a strictly monotone utility
function.
(ii) S satises LARP.
(iii) For all t 2 T , there exist numbers t, t > 0 and vectors Pt 2 Rn++ such
that for all t; v,
t   v  v
X
i2Jv
piv(q
i
t   qiv) + v
X
i=2Jv
P iv(q
i
t   qiv):
(iv) There exist vectors Pt 2 Rn++ such that fPt;qtgt2T satises GARP and for
all t 2 T and i 2 G, if qit > 0, then P it = pit.
(v) S is rationalizable with limited consideration by a concave and strictly mono-
tone utility function.
Let us provide some further intuition behind the equivalences in Theorem 2.
The equivalence between (i) and (ii) shows that rationalizability with limited
consideration is equivalent to LARP. This result might seem a bit surprising,
since LARP does not impose any restriction on observations that have dierent
goods with strictly positive consumption, i.e., where Jt 6= Jv. Assume that S =
fpt;qtgt2T is rationalizable with limited consideration and assume that, relying
on Lemma 1, the consideration are It = Jt. Consider two observations t and v
and assume that qt is revealed preferred to qv,
nX
i=1
pitq
i
t 
nX
i=1
pitq
i
v:
There are two cases to consider. Either Jv  Jt or Jv 6 Jv. In the rst case, every
good consumed at observation v was also in the consideration set at observation
t. In this case, the bundle qv could also have been bought at observation t. By a
simple revealed preference argument, this means that the utility from consuming
qt must be at least as high as the utility from consuming qv. For the second case,
there are some goods which are consumed at observation v that are not in the
consideration set at observation t. In that case, qv is not available at observation
t, so we cannot say that qt is `revealed preferred' to qv. In this sense, we can
dene a limited revealed preference relation R such that qt Rqv i qtRqv and
Jv  Jt. Now, for any cycle in this modied revealed preference relation, say
qt Rqs Rq` : : :qwRqv Rqt;
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we must have that,
Jt  Jv  Jw  : : :  Js  Jt;
or equivalently,
Jt = Jv = Jw = : : : = Jt:
This shows that in order to nd a violation of consistency for this adjusted re-
vealed preference relation, we can restrict ourselves to subsets of observations for
which the sets Jt are the same.
Condition (iii) gives an equivalence in terms of Afriat-type inequalities. The
only dierence between these inequalities and the ones in Theorem 1 is that for
the goods outside Jv, the prices p
j
v are replaced by some (unobserved) prices P
j
v .
To grasp the intuition, assume, for simplicity, that the utility function is strictly
monotone, dierentiable and concave. Next, relying on Lemma 1, let us also
assume that It = Jt. Then from concavity of u(:), we obtain
u(qt)  u(qv) 
nX
i=1
@u(qv)
@qi
(qit   qiv):
The rst order conditions of the utility maximization problem gives,
@u(qv)
@qi
= vp
i
v if q
i
v > 0;
@u(qv)
@qi
 vpiv if qiv = 0; i 2 Jv;
@u(qv)
@qi
= vp
i
v + 
i
v if i =2 Jv;
Here v is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint and 
i
v is the La-
grange multiplier for the consideration set constraint, i.e., qi = 0; i =2 Jt. The
rst condition states that for goods that are consumed with positive amounts the
marginal utility should be equal to the marginal cost. The second constraint says
that for goods that are not consumed but in the consideration set, the marginal
utility should be below the marginal cost. Finally, for goods outside the considera-
tion set, marginal utility can be higher or lower than the marginal cost, depending
on the value of iv. Given that Jt only contains goods for which q
i
v > 0, we can
discard the second rst order condition.
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If we substitute these conditions in the concavity constraint, we obtain that
u(qt)  u(qv)  v
24X
i2Jv
piv(q
i
t   qiv) +
X
i=2Jv

piv +
iv
v

(qit   qiv)
35 ;
Now, set for i =2 Jv, P iv = piv + iv=v, v = u(qv) and t = u(qt). Then we
obtain,
t   v  v
X
i2Jv
piv(q
i
t   qiv) + v
X
i=2Jv
P iv(q
i
t   qiv):
This establishes the Afriat-type inequalities. It also demonstrates that the prices
P jv can be interpreted as the marginal willingness to pay values of the decision
maker for an increase in the consumption of good j at observation t. In the
model without consideration sets, utility maximization requires that this marginal
willingness to pay is equal to the marginal cost pjv for q
j
v > 0, i.e., j 2 Jv or is
less than or equal to pjv if q
j
v = 0, i.e., j =2 Jv. When consideration sets are taken
into account, however, these marginal utilities can also be higher than the prices
pjv for goods outside the consideration set.
Condition (iv) gives an equivalent condition in terms of GARP for the entire
dataset where the price vectors pt are replaced by the vectors Pt. These prices
are allowed to deviate from the true prices for goods that have zero consumption.
The equivalence between (iii) and (iv) follows immediately from the equivalence
between (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 1.
An alternative interpretation for condition (iv) is that the decision maker solves
the same utility maximization model as in Section I, but uses the price vector Pt
instead of the true price vector pt. The next section further explores this idea of
Pt as subjective beliefs about prices in order to propose a model of consideration
set formation.
III. A model of consideration set formation
In the previous section, consideration sets were exogenously determined and
therefore beyond the control of the decision maker. In this section, we provide a
model where the consideration sets are endogenously determined by the decision
maker based on the values of some subjective beliefs about the prices. This
provides a conceptually novel, intuitive framework how consideration sets are
formed.4 Moreover, by imposing more structure on the subjective beliefs, we
provide various alternative models of consumer behavior with additional testable
implications.
4Somewhat similar, Mehta, Rajiv and Srinivasan (2003) construct an econometric model of consid-
eration set formation where consumers are uncertain about the prices on a particular shopping trip.
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Consider a decision maker that would like to spend her budget mt on several
goods. Before she goes shopping, she forms an idea about the bundles that she
would like to buy based on some subjective idea or belief about the prices of
the dierent goods. We denote these subjective prices by Pt 2 Rn++.5 These
subjective prices do not necessarily coincide with the true prices of the goods. In
an initial phase, the decision maker solves
max
q
u(q) s.t. Ptq  mt:
Let us denote by eqt the solution to this problem. Using this bundle, the decision
maker forms an initial consideration set by collecting all goods with positive
amounts in eqt, i.e., eIt = fi 2 Gjeqit > 0g:
Next, the decision maker goes to the shop and investigates the goods in her
consideration set eIt more thoroughly. Thereby, she learns about the actual prices
of these goods. Given this updated information, her subjective belief about the
prices of the goods in eIt is replaced by the true prices pit. Therefore, she now faces
the maximization problem
max
q
u(q) s.t.
X
i2eIt
pitq
i +
X
i=2eIt
P it q
i  mt:
Let qt be the optimal solution to this problem. If there are new goods i =2 eIt for
which qit > 0, these are added to the updated consideration set It:
It = eIt [ fi 2 Gjqit > 0g:
In a next step, she learns the true prices of the new goods in the set It and the
optimization problem becomes
max
q
u(q) s.t.
X
i2It
pitq
i +
X
i=2It
P it q
i  mt:
This process of updating the consideration set and solving the associated utility
maximization problem is iterated until no additional goods are added to the
consideration set. Given that the set of goods is nite and that the consideration
set cannot shrink, this procedure ends after a nite number of rounds.
The above choice procedure models a situation where the decision maker has
some initial idea about the goods she would like to buy (based on the prices Pt).
Given this initial belief, she only gives attention to these goods and, by doing so,
she learns their prices. Once she has observed these prices, she may reconsider
5The case in which a consumer is completely unaware of good i in Period t can be included in this
setup by setting P it suciently large.
12 WORKING PAPER
the set of goods she actually would like to buy. For example, if the price of some
good turns out to be much higher than expected, she might consider buying some
other goods instead of the expensive one. In this way, the consideration set might
expand after learning the prices of some of the goods. This process of updating
the consideration set stops at the moment that she decides not to buy any new
goods.
The nal outcome of this decision problem depends on the subjective prices Pt.
For a good i that never enters the consideration set, there are two possibilities.
First, if P it  pit, the consumer would have chosen qi = 0 even if she had known
the true price. For these goods, the usual revealed preference conditions pose no
problem: if consumption of a certain good is zero, we may always replace the
price by a higher price without strengthening the revealed preference conditions
(see also Lemma 2 below). Second, if P it > p
i
t, it might have been better for the
consumer to include the good in her consideration set.
DEFINITION 3: A dataset S = fpt;qtgt2T is rationalizable with subjective
prices if there exists a (strictly monotone) utility function u(:) : Rn+ ! R and for
all t 2 T , there exist incomes mt, subjective prices Pt 2 Rn++ and consideration
sets It  G such that for all t 2 T , the following two conditions hold:
(i) qt 2 argmaxq u(q) s.t.
P
i2It p
i
tq
i +
P
i=2It P
i
t q
i  mt.
(ii) If i =2 It, then qit = 0.
This rationalizability concept coincides with the nal stage in the dynamic de-
cision process outlined above. The rst condition requires that the chosen con-
sumption bundle qt maximizes the utility given the true prices of the goods in
the consideration set and the subjective prices for the goods outside the consid-
eration set. The second restriction ensures that the decision maker does not wish
to include any additional goods into her consideration set.
As it turns out, the revealed preference conditions for this model are identical
to the model with limited consideration, presented in Section II.
THEOREM 3: Consider a dataset S. The dataset is rationalizable with subjec-
tive prices if and only if it satises LARP.
To understand the intuition behind Theorem 3, consider the equivalent formula-
tion (iv) for LARP in Theorem 2. This condition requires the existence of sub-
jective prices Pt such that for all t 2 T , j 2 G, we have qjt > 0 implies P jt = pjt
and fPt;qtgt2T satises GARP. The GARP condition implies consistency with
utility maximizing behavior for the prices Pt. The other condition requires that
for goods that are consumed, the subjective prices should be equal to the true
prices. These correspond to the two conditions required for rationalizability with
subjective prices.
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A. Restrictions on beliefs
So far, we have abstained from imposing any constraints (bounds) on the values
of the subjective prices Pt. In this section, we consider three types of restrictions.
The next lemma will be useful for deriving the results in this section.
LEMMA 2: Consider two datasets fPt;qtgt2T and fPt;qtgt2T where for all i 2
G; t 2 T ,
(i) if qit > 0, then P
i
t = P
i
t and
(ii) if qit = 0, then P
i
t  P it .
If the dataset fPt;qtgt2T satises GARP, then the dataset fPt;qtgt2T also sat-
ises GARP.
The lemma states that if a dataset is consistent with GARP, then any dataset
that is obtained by increasing the prices for the goods that have zero consump-
tion is also consistent with GARP. Moreover, this lemma shows that imposing
lower bounds on the subjective beliefs does not generate any additional testable
restrictions. As such, we focus our analysis on placing upper bounds.
Beliefs based on the true prices
In the rst model with constrained beliefs, we require that the subjective prices
are not too far from the true prices. Given some xed number   1, we formalize
this by requiring that the beliefs are such that Pt  pt:
DEFINITION 4: A dataset S is -rationalizable with price constrained beliefs
if there exists a (strictly monotone) utility function u(:) : Rn+ ! R and for all
t 2 T , there exist incomes mt, subjective prices Pt 2 Rn++ and consideration sets
It  G, such that for all t 2 T , the following three conditions hold:
(i) qt 2 argmaxq u(q) s.t.
P
i2It p
i
tq
i +
P
i=2It P
i
t q
i  mt.
(ii) P it  pit 8i =2 It.
(iii) If i =2 It, then qit = 0.
The following theorem characterizes the datasets that are rationalizable in this
sense.
THEOREM 4: Consider a dataset S = fpt;qtgt2T . The following statements
are equivalent:
(i) The dataset S is -rationalizable with price constrained beliefs.
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(ii) The dataset S satises -LARP-P, i.e., there exist prices Pt 2 Rn++ such
that fPt;qtgt2T satises GARP and for all t 2 T and j 2 G,
P jt =

pjt if q
j
t > 0
pjt if q
j
t = 0:
It is easy to see that (ii) implies (i). The fact that (i) implies (ii) is a consequence
of Lemma 2. If qit = 0 there are two cases: either i 2 It in which case P it = pit
or i =2 It in which case P it  pit. Given that we do not know which case is the
true one, we may take the highest value given that this gives the weaker revealed
preference restriction.
The parameter  can either be chosen ex ante or determined as the smallest
value of  for which a dataset is still rationalizable (if the dataset satises LARP).
This critical value of  minimizes the (proportional) dierence between the ob-
served true prices piv and the subjective price P
i
v that is necessary to rationalize
the dataset. It can be found using a simple binary search algorithm. If this crit-
ical value is close to one, then the dataset can be rationalized by a model where
the subjective prices are very close to the actual prices. If  is very large, we need
to allow for subjective prices that are far from the actual ones.
Long term beliefs
In our second model with restricted belief, decision makers hold roughly con-
sistent beliefs about the (long term) average prices of the goods but these beliefs
do not take into account short term uctuations from the average price. Let
p = 1T
P
t2T pt be the vector of average prices. We assume that the beliefs Pt
are such that Pt  p, for some xed number   1.
DEFINITION 5: A dataset S is -rationalizable with long term constrained be-
liefs if there exists a (strictly monotone) utility function u(:) : Rn+ ! R and for
all t 2 T , there exist incomes mt, subjective prices Pt 2 Rn++ and consideration
sets It  G, such that for all t 2 T ,
(i) qt 2 argmaxq u(q) s.t.
P
i2It p
i
tq
i +
P
i=2It P
i
t q
i  mt.
(ii) P it  pi 8i =2 It.
(iii) If i =2 It, then qit = 0.
THEOREM 5: Consider a dataset S = fpt;qtgt2T . The following statements
are equivalent:
(i) The dataset S is -rationalizable with long term constrained beliefs.
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(ii) The dataset S satises -LARP-LT, i.e., there exist prices Pt 2 Rn++ such
that fPt;qtgt2T satises GARP and for all t 2 T and j 2 G,
P jt =

pjt if q
j
t > 0;
maxfpjt ; pjtg if qjt = 0:
Again, the fact that (i) implies (ii) is a simple application of Lemma 2: if qjt = 0,
then there are two cases, either j 2 It, in which case P jt = pjt or j =2 It in which
case P jt  pj . Given that we do not know which of the two cases hold, we pick
the highest price as the relevant one given that this provides the weaker revealed
preference restrictions.
Adaptive beliefs
In the third model, beliefs are formed on the basis of past purchases of the
goods. Assume that a certain good was in the consideration set at some time in
the past. At that time, the subjective price was equal to the true price. Assuming
adaptive beliefs, the decision maker takes the last price she observed as the belief
about the current price. In order to formalize this setting, consider for any good
j and observation t, the value `(j; t), where
`(j; t) =

maxfk 2 T jk  t; j 2 Ikg if j 2
S
kt Ik;
0 if j =2 Skt Ik:
The value of `(j; t) gives the last period where good j was in the consideration
set. Observe that if good j is in It, then `(j; t) = t. Of course, it is possible that j
was in no consideration set before observation t. In this case `(j; t) is set to zero.
We assume that the beliefs about good j in period t are such that
P jt = p
j
`(j;t) if `(j; t) > 0:
On the other hand, if j was not previously purchased, i.e., `(j; t) = 0, we impose
no restrictions on the belief P jt .
DEFINITION 6: A dataset S is rationalizable with adaptive beliefs if there ex-
ists a (strictly monotone) utility function u(:) : Rn+ ! R and for all t 2 T , there
exist incomes mt, subjective prices Pt 2 Rn++ and consideration sets It  G, such
that for all t 2 T ,
(i) qt 2 argmaxq u(q) s.t.
P
i2It p
i
tq
i +
P
i=2It P
i
t q
i  mt.
(ii) P it = p
i
`(i;t) if `(i; t) > 0.
(iii) If i =2 It, then qit = 0.
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Towards the revealed preference characterization, dene l(j; t) as
l(j; t) =

maxfk 2 T jk  t; qjk > 0g if j 2
S
kt Jk;
0 if j =2 Skt Jk:
The function l(j; t) gives the last observation prior or equal to t where good j
was consumed with strictly positive amount. Of course, it is equally possible
that good j was not consumed prior to observation t. In that case, we set l(j; t)
equal to zero. Observe that if qjt > 0, then l(j; t) = t and that `(j; t)  l(j; t). If
l(j; t) > 0 this follows from the fact that j 2 Il(j;t). If l(j; t) = 0 this inequality
is trivially satised. Using the denition of l(j; t), we can now state the revealed
preference result:
THEOREM 6: Consider a dataset S = fpt;qtgt2T . Then the following are
equivalent:
(i) The dataset S is rationalizable with adaptive beliefs.
(ii) The dataset S satises LARP-AB, i.e., there exist subjective prices Pt 2
Rn++ such that fPt;qtgt2T satises GARP and for all t 2 T , j 2 G,
P jt =

maxvl(j;t) p
j
v; if l(j; t) > 0;
unrestricted if l(j; t) = 0:
Again, the implication from (i) to (ii) follows from Lemma 2. If l(j; t) > 0, we
know that j 2 Il(j;t), i.e., j was in the consideration set at observation l(j; t).
Also, we cannot exclude the possibility that j was in any other consideration set
after l(j; t). Thus, we take the subjective price to be the highest price over all
observations v for which l(j; t)  v  t. In particular, if l(j; t) = t, i.e., qjt > 0,
we obtain P jt = p
j
t .
IV. Application
We illustrate our results using data from a large homescan dataset. The data
are from ACNielsens Homescan Panel from the Denver area. Detailed description
about the dataset can be found in Aguiar and Hurst (2007). The dataset captures
a wide variety of grocery packed goods purchased by a large number of households
at a large number of retail shops. The dataset covers the period January 1993
through March 1995. The survey is designed to be representative of the Denver
metropolitan area. Households are equipped with an electronic home scanning
unit. After every shopping trip, the shopper scans the UPC (Unique Product
Code) of all the purchased goods and registers the date. Given the UPC, it is
possible to match the purchased goods with price information for the stores within
the area. The full dataset consists of 2,100 separate households and over 950,000
transactions.
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We aggregate the purchase data to monthly aggregates. Shorter time frames
could lead to situations where purchases of one period may be stored and con-
sumed in another period. Longer periods are probably unnecessary given that we
focus on nondurable grocery purchases. Our focus on grocery purchases also re-
quires that we assume that these goods are separable in the utility function from
all other goods and services. We also use non aggregated data which means that
most goods are actually purchased in discrete amounts. This does not immedi-
ately t our framework where quantities are assumed to be continuous. However,
Polisson and Quah (2013) recently showed that even in a discrete goods frame-
work, the usual revealed preference conditions still hold if utility is separable in
the observed goods and an unobserved numeraire good which is innitely divisible
(e.g., money).
Households are observed up to 27 months. This gives us a maximum of 27
observations per household. We use the panel structure in the dataset to verify
the revealed preference restrictions for each household separately. We further
restrict our panel to households for which we have consumption and relevant price
data over all 27 observations.6 This leaves us with a total of 814 households.
Table 1 gives some summary statistics on the dataset. On average, over the
27 months, a household chooses among 28 dierent goods although there is quite
some variation among households. Further, more than 85 percent of all quantities
(good, observation pairs) are zero which means that the consumption data is quite
sparse.
Table 1|Summary statistics
Number of households 814
Fraction nonzero consumption observations 0.14912
(0.0026)
Number of distinct goods per household 28.26
(113.31)
Sample variances are between brackets.
Pass rates
A rst metric to evaluate the dierent revealed preference tests is the pass rate.
The pass rate gives the percentage of all households that are consistent with the
revealed preference test under consideration. Table 2 provides the results. The
pass rate for the GARP test is 12% which is quite low. On the other hand, the
pass rate for the LARP test (98%) is almost equal to unity implying that nearly
all households are consistent with utility maximizing behavior if we allow for the
6In order to obtain reliable price data, we omit goods for which the total quantity bought (over all
households) is below 20.
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presence of consideration sets. However, one must be cautious. When we look at
the size of the partitions that are induced by the LARP test, we see that there are
on average 23.73 equivalence classes per household. Given that each dataset has
27 observations, for most households each observation is in a separate element of
the partition. In these cases, LARP is trivially satised. In other words, the high
pass rate of LARP is mainly due to the fact that people tend to buy new goods
and stop buying other goods quite frequently. Table 2 also gives the pass rates for
rationalizability with price constrained beliefs for various values of . This pass
rate ranges from 41% (for  = 1:05) to 98% (for  = 1:5). Given that the revealed
preference test becomes weaker as  increases, the pass rate cannot decrease. We
omitted the results for  = 1 as this test coincides with the usual GARP test. The
pass rates for rationalizability with long term beliefs are somewhat higher than
the corresponding pass rates for rationalizability with price constrained beliefs.
Finally, the pass rate for rationalizability with adaptive beliefs is equal to 77%.
Power and predictive success
The dierent revealed preference tests are nested in the sense that, for example,
a dataset that passes GARP automatically satises LARP or any other revealed
preference test. Also the tests that impose more structure on the beliefs are
stronger than LARP, so their pass rate cannot be higher. In this sense, it is
unreasonable to compare the performance of the dierent models solely on the
basis of the pass rates. In order to account for the nestedness of the dierent
models, it is crucial to perform a power analysis. Intuitively, the power of a
revealed preference model is given by the probability of rejecting the model when
this model is not the true data generating process.
Usually, the power is computed using Bronars (1987)'s procedure. This proce-
dure computes the probability that a revealed preference test rejects seemingly
irrational (or random) behavior based on the model of irrational behavior from
Becker (1962). In order to compute the Bronars power of a certain dataset for
a specic revealed preference test one rst generates a large number of random
datasets. Each of these random datasets is obtained by drawing for each observa-
tion t 2 T a random consumption bundle uniformly from the budget hyperplane
at observation t (i.e., given prices pt and income mt = ptqt). The power is
then determined by the proportion of these randomly generated datasets that fail
the revealed preference test. A higher power therefore means that less randomly
generated datasets pass the revealed preference test.
Computing the Bronars power in our setting is a bit problematic. Given that
the random consumption bundles for the Bronars power are drawn from a uni-
form distribution on the budget hyperplane, the probability of generating zero
consumption quantities is zero. For such datasets (where qjt > 0 for all t and j)
all tests coincide with the usual GARP test. As such, all models have the same
Bronars power.
In order to alleviate this problem, we propose a modied power measure which
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takes into account the large frequency of zero consumption quantities in the
dataset. Instead of drawing uniform bundles from the entire budget hyperplanes,
we draw uniform bundles from the sub-hyperplane generated by the non-zero
consumption bundles in the vector qt. In other words, all randomly generated
bundles are restricted to have zero consumption quantities for the goods in G
that also have zero consumption in the vector qt. For each of the 814 house-
holds, we generate 1000 such random datasets. The power is then computed as
the proportion of these datasets that fail the corresponding revealed preference
test. The mean of the power results are given in Table 2. Of course, stronger
revealed preference tests have higher power given that they reject more randomly
generated datasets.
As can be seen from Table 2, the pass rates and power of the various models
are inversely related, i.e., low power is associated with higher pass rates and vice
versa. The next step is to combine the two performance measures into a single
index, such that they can be used as a reliable criterion for comparing dierent
but possibly nested models. We do this by using the measure of predictive success
introduced by Selten (1991) and popularized for use in revealed preference analysis
by Beatty and Crawford (2011). Predictive success can be directly calculated as
the dierence between the pass rate and one minus the power.
Predictive success = Pass rate  (1  Power):
The pass rate measures the percentage of households that satisfy a certain revealed
preference test. One minus the power measures the percentage of randomly gen-
erated datasets that satisfy the same revealed preference test. In other words, it
gives the expected pass rate if behavior is random. As such, the dierence deter-
mines how much actual behavior agrees better with the revealed preference test
compared to what is expected if behavior is random. Negative predictive success
values|low pass rate combined with low power|suggest that the revealed pref-
erence test is inadequate for describing observed consumer behavior, since it is at
least as good at explaining random behavior. On the other hand, positive predic-
tive success|high pass rate combined with high power|points to a potentially
useful model that is able to reject irrational behavior while explaining observed
behavior.
The predictive success is given in the third column of Table 2. The last column
gives the 95% asymptotic condence intervals. All models have predictive success
measures that are larger than zero, which means that they outperform the model
which is based on random behavior. LARP seems to perform marginally better
than GARP in terms of predictive success. The dierence between the two pre-
dictive success measures, however, is not statistically signicant at the 5% level
(see Appendix B for details). The subjective rationalizability model with adap-
tive beliefs, outperforms both LARP and GARP in terms of predictive success.
The rationalizability with price constrained beliefs and the rationalizability with
long term constrained beliefs models, with moderate values of  (equal to 1.1 and
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1.05) provide the highest predictive success.
Figure 2 plots the predictive success together with the pointwise 95% condence
intervals for the model of rationalizability with price constrained beliefs and long
term beliefs for varying values of . For both models, the predictive success
attains its peak for rather small values of  which means that subjective prices
do not deviate too much from either the true prices or average prices.
Figure 2. Predictive success for -LARP-P (top) and -LARP-LT (bottom) as a function of 
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Observable heterogeneity
As a nal exercise, we investigate whether predictive success of the dierent
models is related to observable heterogeneity by means of a linear regression of
the individual predictive success measures on some observable household charac-
teristics. As a rst variable we consider the age of the household member who
goes shopping. We choose this variable instead of the variable of the husband and
wife separately because this variable is continuously measured. Next, the dummy
variable Children is equal to one if there are children present in the household.
Married is a dummy variable that indicates if the man and women in the house-
hold are married. Femal and Male college are dummy variables that equal one
if the corresponding household members has at least a college degree. Finally,
Income is a dummy variable that equals one if the household (yearly) income is
above 50.000 dollars.
The results are given in Table 3. We see that the presence of children, being
married and a female household head with college degree has a negative associ-
ation with the predictive success. Male college degree seems to have a positive
association. Income and age has a varying eect depending on the model under
consideration. For GARP, however, we see that no eect is statistically signi-
cant. The eect of children, is statistically signicant for all models with limited
consideration while the dummy for marriage is signicant at the 10% level. In
other words, both married couples and couples with children seem to have a lower
predictive success for limited consideration models.
V. Conclusion
Models of consumer behavior on the basis of consideration sets impose weaker
assumptions than the standard paradigm of utility maximization subject to a
budget constraint. Consumers still maximize their consumption bundles given
their utility functions and market prices, but they consider only a subset of all
available goods|the consideration set. To the best of our knowledge, we have
presented the rst revealed preference analysis for this consideration set consump-
tion model.
Without imposing any restrictions on the way consideration sets are formed,
the revealed preference restrictions boil down to verifying an axiom which we call
the Limited Axiom of Revealed Preference (LARP). Next, we also derived three
rened revealed preference tests that restrict the consideration set formation.
Conceptually, the rened models impose stronger assumptions than LARP, but
weaker assumptions than the standard GARP test.
In our empirical application, we have applied all dierent models using a dataset
on household consumption. All models have positive predictive success, but the
rened models with endogeneous consideration set formation appear to outper-
form both GARP and LARP signicantly. Thus, our paper provides empirical
support for the consideration set approach.
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Up to now, there is no universally accepted framework to model the formation of
consideration sets. We see our paper, which presents models based on subjective
beliefs, as a rst step in that direction. Clearly, more theoretical and empirical
work is needed in order to establish a unied theory of consideration set formation.
In this respect, we believe that the revealed preference approach gives a promising
way to obtain empirical tests and to compare the empirical performance of such
dierent models.
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Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
( ) Straightforward.
(!) Assume that S is rationalizable with limited consideration and let It be the
consideration sets that provide such rationalization. Then there exists a utility
function u such that for all t 2 T ,
qt 2 argmax
q
u(q) s.t. ptq  mt; qi = 0 8 i =2 It:
Since Jt  It and qjt = 0 for all j 2 It n Jt, we obtain
qt 2 argmax
q
u(q) s.t. ptq  mt; qi = 0 8 i =2 It; qj = 0 8 j 2 It n Jt;
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given that the last set of restrictions is not binding. The solution of this maxi-
mization problem is identical to the solution of the problem
max
q
u(q) s.t. ptq  mt; qi = 0 8 i =2 Jt:
Therefore, the sets Jt provide a rationalization with limited consideration.
Proof of Theorem 2
(i) ! (ii) Assume that the dataset is rationalizable with limited consideration.
By Lemma 1, let Jt and mt be the consideration sets and incomes that rationalize
the dataset. Fix an equivalence class E. If v and t belong to E, we have Jv = Jt.
Thus, the inequality ptqt  ptqv implies that qv was feasible at observation t,
but not chosen. Therefore, for any two observations t; v in the same element E
of the partition,
ptqt  ptqv ) u(qt)  u(qv):
If in addition ptqt > ptqv, there exist a bundle q where q > qv, q
i = 0 8i =2 Jt
and ptqt  ptq. By strict monotonicity of the utility function, we obtain u(qt) 
u(q) > u(qv). Thus, for any two observations t and v in the same element of the
partition,
ptqt > ptqv ) u(qt) > u(qv):
By contradiction, assume S violates LARP, i.e., at least one subdataset fpt;qtgt2E
violates GARP. Then we have a sequence of observations t; r; s; : : : ; w; v such that,
ptqt  ptqr;prqr  prqs; : : : ;pwqw  pwqv and pvqv > pvqt:
However, by the reasoning in the rst part of this proof, we obtain
u(qt)  u(qr)  u(qs)  : : :  u(qw)  u(qv) and u(qv) > u(qt);
a contradiction.
(ii)! (iii) Assume that S = fpt;qtgt2T satises LARP. For all t 2 T , dene the
function at(:) : Rn ! R as
at(q) =
X
i2Jt
pitq
i   ptqt + P
X
i=2Jt
pitq
i:
Here, P is set such that for all v 2 T , if Jv 6 Jt, then at(qv) > 0, i.e.,
P > max
v;Jv 6Jt
ptqt  
P
i2Jt p
i
tq
i
vP
i=2Jt p
i
tq
i
v
:
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Such value can always be found, given that the numerator is bounded and the
denominator is strictly positive.
Now, consider a sequence t; s; r; : : : ; w; v. We will rst show that if
at(qs)  0; as(qr)  0; : : : ; aw(qv)  0 and av(qt)  0;
then all inequalities are in fact equalities, i.e., all these terms are equal to zero.
By the denition of the functions at(:) above, this can only happen if
Js  Jt; Jr  Js; : : : ; Jv  Jw and Jt  Jv:
If not, by denition of P , the functions take strictly positive values. Hence, all
sets Jt; Js; Jr; : : : ; Jv are equal, i.e., the observations t; r; s; : : : ; v belong to the
same partition. Therefore,
at(qs) = ptqs   ptqt  0;
as(qr) = psqr   psqs  0;
: : : ;
av(qt) = pvqt   pvqv  0:
Now, if one of these inequalities is a strict inequality, this would imply a violation
of LARP. Therefore, all inequalities should be equalities, which we needed to
show.
Given above property on the functions at(:) we can invoke a result of Fostel,
Scarf and Todd (2004, section 2) that shows it is possible to nd for all t 2 T ,
numbers t 2 R and t 2 R++ such that for all observations t; v 2 T ,
t   v  vav(qt):(A1)
Setting P it = P  pit establishes (iii).
(iii)$ (iv) This is evident from the equivalence between (ii) and (iii) in Theorem
1.
(iii)! (v). Consider the `utility' function
u(q) = min
t2T
ft + tat(q)g:
First of all, this function is strictly monotone and continuous (given that at(q)
is continuous and strictly monotone in q). In fact, the function is concave (given
that at(q) is linear and and the min operator preserves concavity). Also, we
immediately have that
u(qt)  t + tat(qt) = t:
Let us show that this inequality is in fact an equality. Towards a contradiction,
26 WORKING PAPER
assume that u(qt) < t. Then there exists an observation v such that,
u(qt) = v + vav(qt) < t;
() t   v > vav(qt):
However, this contradicts the inequalities in (iii). As such, we see that for all t,
u(qt) = t.
Finally, let us show that this utility function provides a rationalization with
limited attention. For all t, set It = Jt and mt = ptqt. Now, take any bundle q
which is feasible at observation t, i.e., qi = qi = 0 for all i =2 Jt and ptq  mt =
ptqt. Then, by denition,
u(q0)  t + tat(q);
= t + t
X
i2Jt
pitq
i   tptqt + t
X
i=2Jt
P it q
i;
= t + t(ptq  ptqt);
 t = u(qt);
which needed to be shown.
(v)! (i) Straightforward.
Proof of Theorem 3
(!) Assume that S is rationalizable with subjective prices. Then there is a
utility function u such that,
qt 2 argmaxu(q) s.t.
X
i2It
pitq
i +
X
i=2It
P it q
i  mt:
From Theorem 1 it follows that f~Pt;qtgt2T satises GARP where ~P jt = pjt if
j 2 It and ~P jt = P jt else.
Let us show that there exist a vector Pt such that fPt;qtgt2T satises GARP
and P
j
t = p
j
t if j 2 Jt. If,X
i2It
pjtq
j
t +
X
i=2It
P jt q
j
t 
X
i2It
pjtq
j
v +
X
i=2It
P jt q
j
v;
()
X
i2Jt
pjtq
j
t +
X
i2ItnJt
pjtq
j
t +
X
i=2It
P jt q
j
t 
X
i2It
pjtq
j
v +
X
i2ItnJt
pjtq
j
v +
X
i=2Jt
P jt q
j
v;
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Now, set P
j
t = p
j
t if j 2 Jt, P jt = pjt if j 2 It n Jt and P jt = P jt if j =2 It. Then,X
i2Jt
P
j
tq
j
t +
X
i=2Jt
P
j
tq
j
t 
X
i2Jt
P
j
tq
j
v +
X
i=2Jt
P
j
tq
j
v;
Therefore, we see that fPjt ;qtgt2T must also satisfy GARP. Using Theorem 2, we
see that the dataset satises LARP.
( ) If LARP is satised, by Theorem 2, there exist a price vector Pt 2 Rn++ such
that fPt;qtgt2T satises GARP and P jt = pjt if qjt > 0. Then, from Theorem 1,
we know that there exist a utility function such that,
qt = argmax
q
u(q) s.t.
X
i2Jt
pitq
i
t +
X
i=2Jt
P it q
i  mt:
Setting It = Jt shows that this dataset is also rationalizable with subjective
beliefs.
Proof of Lemma 2
Assume that, qt is (strictly) revealed preferred to qv according to the prices PtX
i
P
i
tq
i
t  (>)
X
i
P
i
tq
i
v;
()
X
i
P
i
t(q
i
t   qiv)  (>)0:
Then, we obtain
0  (<)
X
i
P
i
t(q
i
t   qiv);
=
X
i2Jt
P
i
t(q
i
t   qiv) +
X
i=2Jt
P
i
t(0  qiv);

X
i2Jt
P it (q
i
t   qiv) +
X
i=2Jt
P it (0  qiv);
=
X
i2Jt
P it (q
i
t   qiv) +
X
i=2Jt
P it (q
i
t   qiv):
This shows that qt is also (strictly) revealed preferred to qv according to the
prices Pt. As such, if fPt;qtgt2T violates GARP, then fPt;qtgt2T should also
violate GARP which needed to be shown.
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Additional results
The following table provides the bounds (ub: upper bound and lb: lower bound)
of the 95% condence intervals for the dierence between the predictive success
of the dierent models, i.e. the predictive success of the model in a row minus the
predictive success of the corresponding model of the column. For example the CI
for the dierence in predictive success of GARP minus the predictive success of
LARP is
 0:0217 0:0066. We refer to Demuynck (2014) for the construction
of these bounds.
LARP -LARP-P -LARP-LT LARP-AB
 =1.05 1.1 1.25 1.5  =1 1.05 1.1 1.25 1.5
GARP lb -0.0217 -0.0772 -0.0811 -0.0364 -0.0355 -0.0673 -0.0838 -0.0656 -0.0355 -0.0339 -0.0512
ub 0.0066 -0.0416 -0.0432 -0.0038 -0.0063 -0.0324 -0.0471 -0.0305 -0.0041 -0.0049 -0.0172
LARP lb -0.0708 -0.0717 -0.0224 -0.0174 -0.0603 -0.0741 -0.0538 -0.0204 -0.0154 -0.0406
ub -0.0328 -0.0375 -0.0027 -0.0094 -0.0242 -0.0416 -0.0272 -0.0040 -0.0082 -0.0126
-LARP-P
 = 1:05 lb -0.0207 0.0195 0.0191 -0.0096 -0.0261 -0.0085 0.0200 0.0208 0.0048
ub 0.0151 0.0591 0.0578 0.0287 0.0140 0.0312 0.0592 0.0592 0.0456
 = 1:1 lb 0.0256 0.0241 -0.0070 -0.0209 -0.0021 0.0258 0.0258 0.0092
ub 0.0585 0.0584 0.0317 0.0144 0.0303 0.0590 0.0598 0.0468
 = 1:25 lb -0.0103 -0.0484 -0.0611 -0.0401 -0.0070 -0.0089 -0.0295
ub 0.0086 -0.0110 -0.0295 -0.0158 0.0077 0.0103 0.0014
 = 1:5 lb -0.0472 -0.0607 -0.0403 -0.0063 -0.0015 -0.0274
ub -0.0106 -0.0283 -0.0140 0.0085 0.0046 0.0009
-LARP-LT
 = 1 lb -0.0323 -0.0168 0.0115 0.0121 -0.0035
ub 0.0011 0.0203 0.0486 0.0487 0.0348
 = 1:05 lb 0.0041 0.0299 0.0298 0.0142
ub 0.0307 0.0613 0.0623 0.0484
 = 1:1 lb 0.0162 0.0154 -0.0016
ub 0.0403 0.0419 0.0294
 = 1:25 lb -0.0074 -0.0289
ub 0.0082 0.0002
 = 1:5 lb -0.0289
ub -0.0007
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Table 2|Pass rates, power and predictive success
Test pass rate power pred. succ. 95% CI
GARP 0.1179 0.9312 0.0491

0:0300 0:0682

(0.1040) (0.0191) (0.0776)
LARP 0.9853 0.0703 0.0556

0:0482 0:0648

(0.0145) (0.0347) (0.0374)
-LARP-P
 = 1.05 0.4115 0.6968 0.1083

0:0793 0:1373

(0.2422) (0.0746) (0.1778)
 = 1.10 0.6671 0.4440 0.1111

0:0838 0:1384

(0.2221) (0.0966) (0.1577)
 = 1.25 0.9103 0.1587 0.0690

0:0492 0:0889

(0.0816) (0.0584) (0.0834)
 = 1.5 0.9767 0.0932 0.0699

0:0551 0:0846

(0.0228) (0.0386) (0.0462)
-LARP-LT
 = 1 0.4570 0.6418 0.0988

0:0710 0:1265

(0.2482) (0.0849) (0.1629)
 = 1.05 0.6818 0.4325 0.1144

0:0878 0:1408

(0.2169) (0.0976) (0.1489)
 = 1.1 0.8194 0.2776 0.0970

0:0733 0:1207

(0.1480) (0.0806) (0.1192)
 = 1.25 0.9386 0.1301 0.0687

0:0507 0:0868

(0.0576) (0.0498) (0.0691)
 = 1.5 0.9791 0.0892 0.0683

0:0539 0:0827

(0.0204) (0.0374) (0.0441)
LARP-AB 0.7706 0.3125 0.0830

0:0597 0:1065

(0.1768) (0.1055) (0.1158)
Sample variances are between brackets.
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Table 3|Linear regression of household predictive success on observable household char-
acteristics
GARP LARP -LARP-P -LARP-LT LARP-AB
 = 1:1  = 1:05
Constant 0.048174 0.148380 0.208591 0.202142 0.189279
(0.043647) (0.033993) (0.069076) (0.068136) (0.064821)
Age shopper 0.000381 -0.000340 -0.000577 -0.000603 -0.000761
(0.000818) (0.000612) (0.001211) (0.001202) (0.001153)
Children -0.000828 -0.074271 -0.086528 -0.100591 -0.104048
(dummy) (0.024211) (0.014477) (0.035468) (0.035249) (0.032307)
Married -0.013244 -0.070725 -0.046215 -0.045642 -0.043313
(dummy) (0.021056) (0.015617) (0.030070) (0.029116) (0.026403)
Female college -0.026347 -0.009650 -0.038910 -0.015021 -0.006316
(dummy) (0.021419) (0.017729) (0.034033) (0.033351) (0.030383)
Male college 0.026757 0.009563 0.025937 0.034978 0.038221
(dummy) (0.024408) (0.016727) (0.033832) (0.032227) (0.029639)
Income > 50.000 -0.028275 0.000186 -0.001250 0.028176 -0.019740
(dummy) (0.024113) (0.013917) (0.032791) (0.033381) (0.028851)
Heteroscedastic consistent standard errors are between brackets.  = signicant at the 1% level;  =
signicant at the 10% level.
